BackgroundThis article is part of a study to gain insight into the decision-making process by looking at the views of the relatives of potential brain dead donors. Alongside a literature review, focus interviews were held with healthcare professionals about their role in the request and decision-making process when post-mortal donation is at stake. This article describes the perspectives of the relatives.MethodsA content-analysis of 22 semi-structured in-depth interviews with relatives involved in an organ donation decision.ResultsThree themes were identified: ‘conditions’, ‘ethical considerations’ (...) and ‘look back’. Conditions were: ‘sense of urgency’, ‘incompetence to decide’ and ‘agreement between relatives’. Ethical considerations result in a dilemma for non-donor families: aiding people or protecting the deceased’s body, especially when they do not know his/her preference. Donor families respect the deceased’s last will, generally confirmed in the National Donor Register. Looking back, the majority of non-donor families resolved their dilemma by justifying their decision with external arguments. Some non-donor families would like to be supported during decision-making.DiscussionThe discrepancy between general willingness to donate and the actual refusal of a donation request can be explained by multiple factors, with a cumulative effect. Firstly, half of the participants stated that they felt that they were not competent to decide in such a crisis and they seem to struggle with utilitarian considerations against their wish to protect the body. Secondly, non-donor families refused telling that they did not know the deceased’s wishes or contesting posthumous autonomy of the eligible. Thirdly, the findings emphasise the importance of Donor Registration, because it seems to prevent dilemmas in decision-making, at least for donor families.ConclusionDiscrepancies between willingness to consent to donate and refusal at the bedside can be attributed to an unresolved dilemma: aiding people or protect the body of the deceased. Non-donor families felt incompetent to decide. They refused consent for donation, since their deceased had not given any directive. When ethical considerations do not lead to an unambiguous answer, situational factors were pivotal. Relatives of unregistered eligible donors are more prone to unstable decisions. To overcome ambivalence, coaching during decision-making is worth investigation. (shrink)

In their simplest form, consensus gentium arguments for theism argue that theism is true on the basis that everyone believes that theism is true. While such arguments may have been popular in history, they have all but fallen from grace in the philosophy of religion. In this short paper, we reconsider the neglected topic of consensus gentium arguments, paying particular attention to the value of such arguments when deployed in the defence of theistic belief. We argue that while consensus gentium (...) arguments are unlikely to offer anything close to overwhelming support for theism, their probative value is nevertheless underappreciated, and that they have been unfairly maligned as a consequence. (shrink)

In the Netherlands, consent from relatives is obligatory for post mortal donation. This study explored the perspectives of relatives regarding the request for consent for donation in cases without donor registration. A content analysis of narratives of 24 bereaved relatives of unregistered, eligible, brain-dead donors was performed. Relatives of unregistered, brain-dead patients usually refuse consent for donation, even if they harbour pro-donation attitudes themselves, or knew that the deceased favoured organ donation. Half of those who refused consent for donation mentioned (...) afterwards that it could have been an option. The decision not to consent to donation is attributed to contextual factors, such as feeling overwhelmed by the notification of death immediately followed by the request; not being accustomed to speaking about death; inadequate support from other relatives or healthcare professionals, and lengthy procedures. Healthcare professionals could provide better support to relatives prior to donation requests, address their informational needs and adapt their message to individual circumstances. It is anticipated that the number of consenting families could be enlarged by examining the experience of decoupling and offering the possibility of consent for donation after circulatory death if families refuse consent for donation after brain-death. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore some links between deliberative democracy, natural testimony, and epistemic injustice. We hope to highlight the exclusionary effects of some cases of testimony-related epistemic injustice within the deliberative democratic framework and, in particular, two subtle ways of epistemic injustice that are not often highlighted in the political domain. In other words, we hope to highlight two specific mechanisms of epistemic exclusion within the democratic deliberative process that are not explicitly noticed in the relevant literature. In section (...) 1, we present the deliberative model of democracy and the deliberative process. We then introduce the notion of epistemic (dis)enfranchisement, which we distinguish from formal enfranchisement, and explain the role that natural testimony plays in establishing citizens‘ epistemic enfranchisement. In section 2, we introduce Fricker‘s notion of testimonial injustice and two further testimony-related forms of epistemic injustice which seem to have been largely neglected in the debate so far, namely, discursive injustice and testimonial void. We also point out negative epistemic consequences of positive identity-prejudicial stereotypes. In section 3, we argue that these testimony-related forms of epistemic injustice can lead to epistemic disenfranchisement, which, we note, is an obstacle to deliberative democracy that warrants serious consideration. (shrink)

Marcel Beaufils fut un pedagogue exceptionnel qui exerca une influence decisive sur l'evolution de l'esthetique musicale en France, a partir des annees 50. Or, parmi ses ouvrages, Musique du son, musique du verbe est tres certainement celui qui porte le plus fortement la marque de son activite d'enseignant au Conservatoire National Superieur de Musique de Paris ; cette mission, il semblait l'entendre davantage comme celle d'un declencheur d'idees, catalyseur, plutot que du transmetteur d'un savoir fige une fois pour toutes. Bouleversant (...) toute tentative de classification academique, toute certitude acquise, ce livre laisse des pointilles ; un grand souffle traverse son ecriture. N'en deplaise aux musicographes, il s'agit la d'un ouvrage de creation, qui nous rappelle que Marce Beaufils etait egalement un ecrivain qui savait manier le verbe a la fois en tant que dramaturge et en tant que poete. (shrink)

The issue of trust has increasingly attracted attention in the business ethics literature. Our aim is to contribute further to this literature by examining how the use of the carbon copy function in email communication influences felt trust. We develop the argument that the use of cc enhances transparency—representing an important characteristic of workplace ethics—and hence promotes trust. We further argue that a downside of the cc option may be that it can also be experienced as a control mechanism, which (...) may therefore negatively affect trust. The results of our first study showed that the use of cc indeed enhances perceived transparency, but at the same time also leads to the experience of increased control. Building upon this insight, the findings of five subsequent studies consistently revealed that the use of cc negatively influences felt trust. More precisely, employees felt trusted the least when the supervisor was always included in cc. This effect on felt trust also negatively influenced how trustworthy the organizational climate was perceived. We further replicated these results in two field surveys, which showed that the negative effect of cc on felt trust lowered perceptions of psychological safety and contributed to a culture of fear. Taken together, our findings suggest that when transparency in email communications is experienced as a control mechanism, its use is perceived as unethical, rather than as ethical. Implications and recommendations for future business ethics research are discussed. (shrink)

François Lamy, a Benedictine monk and Cartesian philosopher whose extensive relations with Arnauld, Bossuet, Fénélon, and Malebranche put him into contact with the intellectual elite of late-seventeenth-century France, authored the very first detailed and explicit refutation of Spinoza’s Ethics in French, Le nouvel athéisme renversé. Regrettably overlooked in the secondary literature on Spinoza, Lamy is an interesting figure in his own right, and his anti-Spinozist work sheds important light on Cartesian assumptions that inform the earliest phase of Spinoza’s critical reception (...) in the seventeenth-century. I begin by presenting Lamy’s life and the contentious state of Spinoza’s French reception in the 1680 and 1690s. I then discuss a central argument in Lamy’s refutation, namely the Cartesian objection that Spinoza’s account of the conceptual independence of attributes is incompatible with the theory of substance monism. Contrasting Lamy’s objection with questions put to Spinoza by de Vries and Tschirnhaus, I maintain that by exhibiting the direction Spinoza’s views on substance and attribute took in maturing we may accurately assess the strength of Spinoza’s position vis-à-vis his Cartesian objector, and I argue that, in fact, Spinoza’s mature account of God as an expressive ens realissimum is not vulnerable to Lamy’s criticism. In conclusion, I turn to Lamy’s objection that Spinoza’s philosophy is question-begging in view of Spinoza’s account of God, and I exhibit what this point of criticism tells us about the intentions of the first French Cartesian rebuttal of the Ethics. (shrink)

Passant du cinéma d’animation pour enfants (en suivant les exemples de films comme Chicken Run et Le monde de Nemo ) aux artistes queer contemporaines qui ont embrassé l’échec comme un style à part entière, Jack Halberstam part à la recherche de modèles de parentés, d’alliances et de communautés pour faire alternative au monde néo-libéral et à l’idéologie du succès qui en façonne les subjectivités. Cette idéologie se déploie notamment au travers des multiples injonctions à « réussir » dans les (...) différents aspects de la vie sociale : il faut produire, accumuler et se reproduire – autant de maillons dans la chaîne de (re)production du capital. Dans The Queer Art of Failure, Halberstam propose une méthode de déviance joyeuse par rapport à cette idéologie du succès : « d’abord, résister à la maîtrise » ; « ensuite, privilégier la naïveté et l’absurdité (la stupidité) ». (shrink)

John Buridan was the most famous philosophy teacher of his time, and probably the most influential. In this important new book, Jack Zupko offers the first systematic exposition of Buridan's thought to appear in any language. Zupko uses Buridan's own conception of the order and practice of philosophy to depict the most salient features of his thought, beginning with his views on the nature of language and logic and then illustrating their application to a series of topics in metaphysics, natural (...) philosophy, and ethics. Part 1 of John Buridan considers the picture of language and logic developed in Buridan's Summulae de dialectica. Buridan systematically overhauled the logic he first learned and later taught at the University of Paris, redeeming the older tradition of Aristotelian logic in terms, propositions, and arguments. This made possible newer and more powerful forms of philosophical discourse. The second part of this volume provides a reading of Buridan's philosophy, showing how this discourse shaped his treatment of speculative questions such as the relation between soul and body, the nature of knowledge, the proper subject of psychology, the function of the. (shrink)

Leibniz devoted immense energy and thought to questions concerning moral responsibility and human freedom. This paper examines Leibniz’s views on freedom and sin in two important early texts - “Von der Allmacht Allmacht und Allwissenheit Gottes und der Freiheit des Menschen” and “Confessio Philosophi” - as a propaedeutic to a detailed examination of the development of Leibniz’s views on freedom and sin. In particular, my aim is to see if Leibniz’s early thinking on freedom and sin in these early writings (...) was among those metaphysical topics about which he changed his mind. My focus is on human, not divine, freedom, and the young Leibniz’s metaphysical psychology, rather than his early efforts in theodicy. I conclude that Leibniz’s views on freedom and sin are in place as early as 1672/3, and remain relatively stable thereafter. (shrink)

Leibniz devoted immense energy and thought to questions concerning moral responsibility and human freedom. This paper examines Leibniz’s views on freedom and sin in two important early texts - “Von der Allmacht Allmacht und Allwissenheit Gottes und der Freiheit des Menschen” and “Confessio Philosophi” - as a propaedeutic to a detailed examination of the development of Leibniz’s views on freedom and sin. In particular, my aim is to see if Leibniz’s early thinking on freedom and sin in these early writings (...) was among those metaphysical topics about which he changed his mind. My focus is on human, not divine, freedom, and the young Leibniz’s metaphysical psychology, rather than his early efforts in theodicy. I conclude that Leibniz’s views on freedom and sin are in place as early as 1672/3, and remain relatively stable thereafter. (shrink)

This essay is a critical notice of David Dyzenhaus's book, The Long Arc of Legality. I argue that Dyzenhaus’s criterion for distinguishing legal pathologies that undermine law's contractarian claim to legitimacy and political pathologies that do not is unsustainable. It relies on a categorical distinction between the threat to law's legitimacy posed by treating some subjects as de jure second-class citizens, whose formal legal status is compromised, and other threats to political legitimacy grounded in the treatment of some subjects as (...) de facto second-class citizens, who retain full formal legal equality but suffer from thoroughgoing substantive subordination. But some forms of de facto second-class citizenship are a greater threat to contractarian legitimacy than some forms of full formal equality. So formal equality for subjects and legal legitimacy come apart. I consider and respond to several responses on Dyzenhaus's behalf, and conclude by proposing a version of his jurisprudential theory that relaxes this distinction. (shrink)

China has always served Western thinkers as a lens through which to project convenient contrasts and exemplars for their self-aggrandizement and self-realization. Weber’s treatment in The Religion of China is no exception. Weber’s purpose in this text is to demonstrate the exclusive provision in Europe of the conditions for the development of modern or industrial capitalism. To achieve this purpose Weber presents a distorted vision of both Confucianism and Daoism, even against the limited sinological material at his disposal. The discussion (...) of Chinese ‘mentality’, as Weber calls it in The Religion of China, functions in terms of European categories drawn from his discussion of historical and classical cases that are alien to Chinese developments but which serve the purpose of his argument. Indeed, the details of his earlier work, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, are similarly distorted by Weber in The Religion of China to permit him to more forcefully demonstrate the unsuitability of Confucianism to inculcate a sense of calling parallel to the Protestant ideal of vocation discussed in the Protestant Ethic. The paper shall both discuss Weber’s sinological sources and his use of them. It shall also show that late-imperial Chinese entrepreneurial activity was capitalistic in its institutional form and that the absence of industrial capitalism in China during the Qing dynasty was a consequence of demographic and political factors rather than resulting from the absence of religious values. (shrink)

I first met Hans Albert in 1974, when together with two friends, Rob de Vries and Berry van Berkel, I participated in the European Forum Alpbach for the first time. We attended the seminar that was led by John Watkins and Walter Kaufmann and, of course, went to as many of the plenary meetings as possible. At the time, the seminar week and the bulk of the plenary events were still organized during the same period and were included in the (...) fee, neither of which is unfortunately the case any longer. (shrink)

Une analyse de l'interprétation de la philosophie spinoziste comme philosophie de l'immanence soutenue par G. Deleuze, notamment dans "Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?" (Paris: Éd. Minuit, 1991).

Le mémoire de Master 2. Soutenu en 2012 à Paris VIII sous la direction de Ch. Ramond. A study of Spinoza's account of "singular things" in the Ethics along with the classic French literature on the subject. -/- TABLE DES MATIÈRES: INTRODUCTION GENERALE (p. 3 – 4) PREMIERE PARTIE : DE LA NATURE DE DIEU AUX CHOSES SINGULIERES (p. 5 – 97) INTRODUCTION (p. 5 – 16) : DU RAPPORT DE L’INFINIMENT INFINI ET DU FINI. Pourquoi l’Éthique commence par l’infiniment (...) infini (Dieu). De l’immanentisme spinoziste. Abrégé de la réalité des choses singulières. Que celles-ci sont « en autre chose » et que cet autre est Dieu. Rôle important de la « cause de soi » dans l’ontologie spinoziste. Description de la démarche à suivre. PREMIER PAS (p. 17 – 39) : DE LA « CAUSE DE SOI ». Sur la définition de la « cause de soi ». De la méthode géométrique, et de la raison pour laquelle l’Éthique commence avec cette définition d’un Ens causa sui. Comment la notion de la « cause de soi » fonde l’idée de Dieu. Du monisme intégral chez Spinoza. De « l’esprit » du spinozisme et du déterminisme absolu. Du dédoublement de Dieu. INTERMEDE (p. 40– 60) : DE LA PROPOSITION 16 ET DES MODES INFINIS. Derechef, du dédoublement de Dieu, et en particulier, du renversement de la situation théorique du qualitatif et du quantitatif dans le système. Rôle de la Proposition 16 dans le système. Comment celle-ci scelle le passage de l’Ens causa sui à l’Ens effectus sui. Pourquoi I 16 est controversé. Comment I 16 nous apprend que Dieu ne produit nécessairement tout qu’à condition de produire de l’intelligible. De l’intellect de Dieu. Des modes, et des modes infinis en particulier. À propos du souci néoplatonicien. SECOND PAS (p. 61 – 91) : DE L’ESSENCE ET L’EXISTENCE DES CHOSES EN ÉI. Les Propositions 24 et 25. Comment Dieu scinde les essences des existences. Que toute chose finie est par essence dans un rapport intime avec sa cause infinie et verticale. Le Scolie de la Proposition 25. Sur la démonstration de la définition des « choses particulières ». Sur la controverse de l’attribut. Les Proposition 26 et 28. Comment les choses existent. De la causalité horizontale et de l’indéfini. Analyse de la notion de l’infini. De l’impossibilité de comprendre totalement l’existence d’une chose. Ce qui veut dire « Deus quatenus ». FIN DE LA PREMIERE PARTIE (p. 92 – 97) : DE LA NATURE NATURANTE ET LA NATURE NATUREE. Analyse du Scolie de la Proposition 29. De l’asymétrie du dédoublement de la Nature. Du salut spinoziste. DEUXIEME PARTIE : DE L’UNITE DES CHOSES SINGULIERES (p. 98 – 153) INTRODUCTION (p. 98 – 102) : DU RAPPORT DE L’ESSENCE A L’EXISTENCE. Ce qui se passe lorsqu’on quitte une Partie de l’Éthique. De ce qu’on a vu dans notre Première Partie. De la causalité verticale et de la causalité horizontale. Comment les essences peuvent-elles retrouver les existences, et vice versa. Description de la démarche à suivre. PREMIER PAS (p. 103 – 127) : DE L’ESSENCE Sur la définition d’une « essence ». De sa positivité. Que ce qu’un individu est par essence n’est que ce qu’il peut comprendre. De la Proposition 8, de son Corollaire et de son Scolie. Que l’existence de l’essence d’une chose ne se confond pas avec l’existence de la chose elle-même. Contre l’idée que les essences sont des choses « possibles ». Sur la notion des « grandeurs intensives » et sur la notion du « profondeur » chez Spinoza. SECOND PAS (p. 128 – 149) : DU CONATUS A LA PHYSIQUE Sur le concept du conatus. Du fait qu’il est l’essence actuelle d’une chose. Qu’on ne peut pas distinguer entre notre puissance ou effort pour persévérer dans l’être et l’être dans lequel nous nous persévérons. Du dynamisme introduit par le biais du conatus. Du rapport du quantitatif et du qualitatif, de l’idée des instants d’éternité, et du problème des essences qui sont instantanées. De la « petite physique » dans la Deuxième Partie de l’Éthique. Sur ses enjeux théoriques. Sur le matérialisme de Spinoza. De la définition de l’Individu comme rapport fixe de mouvement et de repos. Des corps simples, et que pour toute chose existante il n’est pas donné une essence. De la définition des choses singulières, et encore de la mutabilité ontologique de celles-ci. FIN DE LA DEUXIEME PARTIE (p. 150 – 153) : DE LA FINITUDE Sur l’Axiome de la Quatrième Partie de l’Éthique. Que certains rapports de mouvement et de repos en remplacent d’autres. Sur la raison pour laquelle tout rapport ne peut pas coexister. Que la destructibilité vient du biais de l’Étendue, et en particulier, du problème de l’espace. Que la chose singulière véhicule une tension entre la partie et le tout, et encore, du salut spinoziste. CONCLUSION GENERALE (p. 154 – 157) ENGLISH SUMMARY (p. 158 – 159) BIBLIOGRAPHIE (p. 160 – 165) TABLE DES MATIERES (p. 166 – 169). (shrink)

Scholarly analysis of the political philosophy of the eminent 19th century Frenchman.

America’s industries and families continue to forsake cities for suburban and rural environs, in the process leaving nonproductive lands (brownfields) and simultaneously removing greenfield land from agriculturally or biologically productive use. In spite of noteworthy exceptions, urban regions which once functioned as vital communities continue in economic and social decline. Discussion or debate about the problem (or, indeed, whether it is a problem at all) invokes systems of values which often are not articulated. Some attribute the urban exodus to departure (...) from personal ethical norms (e.g., substance abuse, violence, welfare addiction) by urban residents, as though ethical decline is driving the phenomenon. Others take the exact opposite stance, that social and economic decline follow the departure of the economic base. There is no consensus on what government should do about the problem, or whether government should be involved at all. I present elements of a land-use ethic which can accommodate the foregoing. I argue that government is already involved in the brownfields problem because urban flight is facilitated by public policies which de facto subsidize the process. I further argue that the debate invokes key—but unexamined—assumptions regarding limits. Where there are few substitutes for resources and the social cost of exploitation is high, government intervention in the market is necessary; “value-free” economic approaches need to be supplemented by values concerning what ought to be, i.e., what is desirable for society. (shrink)

America’s industries and families continue to forsake cities for suburban and rural environs, in the process leaving nonproductive lands (brownfields) and simultaneously removing greenfield land from agriculturally or biologically productive use. In spite of noteworthy exceptions, urban regions which once functioned as vital communities continue in economic and social decline. Discussion or debate about the problem (or, indeed, whether it is a problem at all) invokes systems of values which often are not articulated. Some attribute the urban exodus to departure (...) from personal ethical norms (e.g., substance abuse, violence, welfare addiction) by urban residents, as though ethical decline is driving the phenomenon. Others take the exact opposite stance, that social and economic decline follow the departure of the economic base. There is no consensus on what government should do about the problem, or whether government should be involved at all. I present elements of a land-use ethic which can accommodate the foregoing. I argue that government is already involved in the brownfields problem because urban flight is facilitated by public policies which de facto subsidize the process. I further argue that the debate invokes key—but unexamined—assumptions regarding limits. Where there are few substitutes for resources and the social cost of exploitation is high, government intervention in the market is necessary; “value-free” economic approaches need to be supplemented by values concerning what ought to be, i.e., what is desirable for society. (shrink)

Résumé Cet article considère que l’émergence de valeurs humanistes n’est pas un phénomène purement moderne. Si par humanisme nous entendons l’essor des savoirs laïques et scientifiques, nous pouvons constater sa présence à certaines époques de l’histoire de l’Islam. L’Humanisme dans le sens du respect des « valeurs humaines » comme la démocratie est tout aussi étendu dans le temps et dans l’espace. Donc l’idée que l’Occident, en tant qu’héritier de la Grèce antique, en possède le monopole est assez intenable. Des (...) sociétés tribales pratiquent bien souvent des versions de la démocratie directe, la représentation étant un aspect des régimes beaucoup plus complexes. En outre, même parmi les États monarchiques, rares sont ceux qui peuvent à long terme se permettre d’ignorer l’opinion publique. Les démocraties représentatives modernes en revanche se dispensent souvent de consulter leurs électorats pour des décisions telles que la déclaration des guerres. En tout cas, elles ne constituent qu’un mode de représentation parmi d’autres et n’ont pas le monopole de la vertu, surtout dans les communautés divisées sur le plan religieux. Ailleurs elles peuvent servir de dispositif de légitimation, comme dans le cas d’Israël. (shrink)

Nous cherchons ici à étudier la signification du fait qu’un État, chez Spinoza, peut se comprendre intégralement comme étant une « âme » singulière. Nous montrons en quoi cette compréhension de l’État comme « âme » permet d’expliciter les éléments centraux de la théorie de l’obéissance chez Spinoza, et en quoi le succès du projet politique spinoziste n’est envisageable que de cette perspective. Nous soulevons en conclusion un paradoxe : Spinoza écrit (TP 3/8) que nul ne cède de sa faculté (...) de juger ; et à force de tirer sur ce fil, nous montrons que Spinoza y aborde de façon discrète et indirecte la possibilité de la disparition de l’État, dans la mesure même où il aura réussi à encourager l’obéissance et à faire en sorte que « l’âme » de tous devienne un bien commun. (shrink)

In deze bewogen ‘Notities over de verloren ziel van de cultuur’ signaleert Jack Miles hoe religie tot kitsch dreigt te verworden wanneer we haar uitsluitend bezien in concurrentie met de voortschrijdende wetenschap. Pas zodra we deze tweestrijd over rivaliserende kennisaanspraken opgeven en onze duurzame onwetendheid onder ogen zien, is er ruimte voor een religiositeit die geen kitsch is en het ontzag, de verering en de angst voor het Onbekende een plaats geeft in ons leven. Uiteindelijk zouden de klassieke religies van (...) Europa - judaïsme en christendom – een analoge plaats moeten krijgen in de bestudering van onze cultuur, doordat we ze bezien per differentiam, waardoor we ze met een antropologische nieuwsgierigheid tegemoet kunnen treden. (shrink)

In a new book titled Wild Things: Queer Theory After Nature, I develop a new critical vocabulary to access different, transdisciplinary ways of thinking about race, sexuality, alternative political imaginaries and queer futurity and extinction. Wildness in no way signals the untamed frontier, or the absence of modernity, the barbarian, the animalistic or the opposite of civilization. Rather, in a post-colonial and even de-colonizing vein, it has emerged in the last few years as a marker of a desire to return (...) queerness to the disorder of an unsorted field of desires and drives; to the disorienting and disquieting signifying functions it once named and held in place; and to a set of activist and even pedagogical strategies that depend upon chance, randomness, surprise, entropy and that seek to counter the organizing and bureaucratic logics of the state with potential sites of ungovernability and abjection. Wildness signifies in my project in a number of different ways, but here I use the framework of “abjection” to explain some of the appeal of wildness and a few of the ways in which it expresses relations between the unnamable, the excessive, horror and death. Later on, I will turn to a set of performances and art projects that are deliberately auto destructive and that collectively imagine the end of the human. (shrink)